Abstract: This paper shows that the effects of capital account liberalization on growth depend upon the environment in which that policy change occurs. A theoretical model demonstrates how the institutional quality of a country, reflecting the extent to which its capital is protected from expropriation, affects the responsiveness of growth to capital account liberalization. In particular, this model predicts a non-monotonic, inverted-U shaped relationship between the amount of time during which the capital account is liberalized and economic growth. A specification drawn from this model is tested by considering the determinants of economic growth over the period 1976 -1995 for a panel of 71 countries. The estimates of this model strongly support a non-monotonic interaction between capital account liberalization and institutional quality, with 20 percent of the countries, those with better (but not the best) institutions exhibiting a significant relationship between capital account openness and economic growth.
Introduction
Capital account liberalization is so '90s. During the first half of that decade, the boom in emerging markets and the success of industrial countries that opened up to international capital flows seemed to point to the importance of this policy as one way for countries to join the global economy. But, in the wake of the economic and financial crises in the latter part of that decade, critics began to question the wisdom of this aspect of liberalization. These critics included well-respected mainstream economists who strongly favor free trade in goods and services but maintained that trade in assets differed issue of the IMF's publication Finance and Development "These days, everyone agrees that a more eclectic approach to capital account liberalization is required." (p. 55). This paper investigates how the economic environment in which capital account liberalization occurs affects its impact on economic growth. Section 2 presents a model of capital account liberalization in the presence of expropriation. This model suggests that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness and the extent of expropriation of capital. The model offers guidance for an empirical analysis, and this analysis is presented in Section 3. The evidence from this cross-country analysis supports the main prediction of the model concerning a non-monotonic effect of institutional quality on the effect of capital account openness on growth.
Capital Account Liberalization, Institutional Quality, and Growth
The model presented in this section illustrates how the effect of capital account liberalization on growth depends upon the quality of particular domestic institutions.
Institutional quality in this model represents the extent to which investors are protected 2 See the survey of the literature on capital account openness and growth by Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok (forthcoming) . This theory section first presents, in Section 2.1, a neoclassical growth model with two types of capital under the conditions of financial autarky whereby all capital is funded from domestic savings. The rate of expropriation is a parameter of this model.
An alternative version of this model, one that includes partial capital mobility (following the contribution of Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin 1995) is presented next in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 models capital account liberalization by drawing on the solutions for the autarkic and partial capital mobility cases.
The solution presented in Section 2.3 provides a framework for the empirical analysis that follows and guides the specification incorporating institutional quality and capital account liberalization. The model predicts that increasing institutional quality has a non-monotonic effect on the responsiveness of growth to the timing of capital account liberalization. A numerical analysis of the model shows that the effect on growth of the amount of time spent with an open capital account first increases, and then decreases, with improvements in institutional quality. The model also suggests that the rate of conditional convergence increases with an earlier liberalization of the capital account.
Steady State Output and Growth under Financial Autarky
The model used in this paper has two types of capital, K and H. Under financial autarky, the situation studied in this subsection, there is little difference in the characteristics of K and H but, as discussed below, an important difference exists when international borrowing and lending occurs.
The production function for this economy includes K and H, as well as L, the number of workers, and E, the efficiency of labor, and is given by
where Y is output and both α and β are between 0 and 1. We study the model with the variables expressed in terms of effective units of labor, and define y = Y / EL, k = K / EL and h = H / EL. Using these variables, the production function is
The model attempts to capture the fact that poor institutions lower the return to capital because, with poor institutions, some savings of domestic residents fail to translate to investment because of the malfeasance of governmental or private actors who are not appropriately constrained by law. Institutional quality is negatively related to the amount of expropriation that occurs. This model includes the parameter τ which represents the rate of expropriation of both types of capital by the government or others (0 < τ < 1), and, therefore, an index for the quality of institutions is (1 -τ).
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The parameter τ appears in the capital accumulation equations for both K and H under autarky, when both types of capital can only be accumulated only through domestic savings. The capital accumulation equations, expressed in terms of k and h, are 3 We assume that τ is the same for both H and K in order to obtain more analytically tractable results, but allowing τ to differ for H and K would not alter the basic results of the model. where dt
• , s K is the proportion of savings devoted to the formation of K, s H is the proportion of savings devoted to the formation of H, and δ is the rate of depreciation of both types of capital (0 < δ < 1).
The steady state value of output per effective unit of labor of this economy under financial autarky,
Naturally enough, steady state output per effective unit of labor in autarky is higher with a higher level of institutional quality (that is, with a lower value of τ).
Below we will compare the dynamic path of output per effective worker under autarky and under partial capital mobility. A Taylor-series expansion around the steady state yields the differential equation for output per effective unit of labor under autarky
Note that this rate of convergence is more rapid if τ is larger since, in this case, the steady state level of output per effective worker is lower. 
Steady State Output and Growth with Partial Capital Mobility
With no restrictions on its movement, and no cost of adjustment, capital would move instantaneously to capital-scarce countries and equalize rates of return across nations. A model with this feature would have no meaningful transition dynamics. The results of such a model are obviously at odds with experience.
A more reasonable result is obtained if one assumes partial capital mobility, whereby there is perfect international capital mobility for some types of capital but not for others. Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) As in the case under autarky, steady state output per effective unit of labor is higher with a higher level of institutional quality (that is, with a lower value of τ) when there is partial capital mobility.
Below it will be shown that the effect of institutional quality on steady state output under autarky relative to its effect under partial capital mobility is an important determinant of the partial derivative of growth with respect to capital account liberalization. The results in [4] and [7] can be combined to yield the ratio of steady state output per effective unit of labor under autarky to its value under partial capital mobility, we see that the rate of convergence is more rapid for a country with partial capital mobility than for a country that operates under financial autarky, a point noted by Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) .
Empirical Specification
The results presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 can be used to provide a framework for the specification of an empirical analysis of the effects of capital account [10]
where, in the second line, C represents the term in curly brackets in the first line (0 < C < 1) and S represents the term in square brackets in the first line (S > 0). Equation [10] , which motivates the empirical specification used in Section 3, has implications with respect to the effect of the amount of time with an open capital account on the rate of convergence as well as the effect of institutional quality on the responsiveness of growth to capital account liberalization. We next explore these implications.
The Responsiveness of Growth to Capital Account Liberalization
The presence of S in Equation [10] motivates the inclusion in a growth regression of a range of variables, including an indicator of capital account openness. We define this indicator of capital account openness as T
The coefficient on capital account openness in an empirical specification derived from a first-order Taylor series 
Convergence
The rate of convergence, as represented by C in Equation [10] , varies with both institutional quality and the amount of time spent with an open capital account. This can be seen by calculating the values of C, and the half lives associated with these values, for various values of (T -L) and (1 -τ). These calculations are presented in Table 1 .
The numbers presented in Table 1 The numbers presented in Table 1 also demonstrates that the rate of convergence decreases, and the associated half-life increases, with an increase in institutional quality, given the amount of time with an open capital account. For example, compare the half life of an economy that is open throughout the period when there is no expropriation of capital (1.89 years) to that when the 1 -τ = 0.70 (0.78 years). This result is consistent with the discussion above concerning, in the autarkic and partial capital mobility cases, the effect of institutional quality on the rate of convergence.
Empirical Estimates
This section presents an empirical analysis of the manner in which the interaction between capital account openness and institutional quality affects economic growth. The section opens with a discussion of an empirical specification drawn from the model developed in Section 2. Capital account openness and institutional quality are at the center of this analysis, and Section 3.2 describes the indicators representing these variables employed in this study. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 3.3.
As shown in that section, the empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model with respect the non-monotonic relationship between the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness and institutional quality. There is also some evidence that the rate of conditional convergence is faster in economies that have a longer experience with open capital accounts.
Specification
The model developed in Section 2 guides the empirical analysis presented in this But the analysis presented in Section 2 is useful because it points out two ways in which the standard specification may be too restrictive. First, the model presented above suggests that rate of convergence may differ across countries and depend upon both the proportion of years a country had an open capital account and institutional quality.
Second, and more central to this analysis, this model also demonstrates that there may be an important non-monotonic interaction between institutional quality and the responsiveness of economic growth to capital account openness.
A specification that is flexible enough to capture differences in rates of convergence associated with differences in capital account openness and institutional quality, as well as a non-monotonic relationship between capital account openness and growth is [12] ( ) There is the potential for this term to confound the effects of capital account openness on growth through its effect on steady state income because initial income is significantly correlated with institutional quality. Therefore, we first present an estimate of γ calculated from a model in which the rate of convergence does not vary with institutional quality and capital account openness (that is, a model like [12] but where β 1 = β 2 = 0). In that case of constant conditional convergence, the estimated value of γ is simply ( While one might expect wide differences in γ across these two specifications that treat convergence in alternative manners, the estimated value of γ is very similar in both cases, as will be demonstrated below.
Indicators of Capital Account Openness and Institutional Quality
The implementation of the specification presented in the previous section requires the use of indicators of capital account openness and institutional quality. We discuss these indicators in this section.
Indicator of Capital Account Openness
The theoretical model presented in Section 2 includes the parameter κ which represents the proportion of years that a country had a continuously open capital account. This parameter closely corresponds to an indicator of capital account openness commonly used in empirical studies of the effects of capital account openness on growth. and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , Kraay (1998) , Rodrik (1998) and Klein and Olivei (1999) , construct from this information a variable reflecting the proportion of years in which countries had open capital accounts. We will call this indicator of capital account openness Share.
This indicator is based on information in the

12 The 1997 issue of Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions expanded the summary information on capital controls including, for the first time, a distinction between restrictions on inflows and restrictions on outflows. Unfortunately, this new classification system cannot be mapped into the early system, making the use of a panel bridging the pre-1996 and post-1996 data problematic. 13 An alternative empirical indicator of capital account openness has been developed by Dennis Quinn. These indicators record the intensity of controls, but are only available for a limited set of years for non-industrial countries. Edison, Klein, Slok and Ricci (forthcoming) compare Share to Quinn's indicators. Quinn's indicators for 1973 are used in this paper as instruments in the IV regressions presented below. 
Indicator of Institutional Quality
The Q. This regression shows a highly significant link between the logarithm of initial income per capita and institutional quality. As mentioned above, this estimate is used to evaluate the effect of institutional quality on the responsiveness of growth to capital account liberalization in some specifications of the model. Panel C of Table 2 shows that there is a very high correlation between all five components of the overall indicator of institutional quality. This correlation matrix shows why the results of the estimates presented below are largely unchanged if any single component is used rather than the average of all five, as well as if a different weighting scheme is used to calculate the overall indicator of institutional quality.
Capital Account Openness, Income and Growth
This section presents estimation results in several ways. The estimated coefficients from regressions along with their standard errors are presented in Table 4 .
But the central question of interest, how the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness varies with institutional quality, is not immediately apparent from these coefficient estimates. Therefore, the lower panel of Table 4 such that the estimated value of γ is significant, and the percentiles spanned by this set of
countries.
An even clearer representation of the way in which γ varies with of Q i is provided in Figures 2 -5 . Each of these figures plots, for one of the specifications reported in Table 4 , the estimated value of γ (in a line that includes symbols representing observed values of Q i ) along with the associated 95 percent confidence intervals (the boundaries of which are represented by a dashed and a dotted line). The estimates in Column 2 of The lower panel of Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 show that fewer countries have a significant estimated value of γ with IV estimates than with OLS estimates, a result partially due to the smaller sample available for the IV estimates. Figures 4 and 5 also show, however, that over the range of values of Q for which γ is significant in the IV estimates, or even over the larger range of values of Q for which γ is significant in the OLS estimates, the IV and OLS estimates of γ track each other closely.
Conclusion
The debate over the consequences of capital account liberalization tends to be painted in broad strokes of black and white. This paper suggests a more nuanced approach, one that allows for shades of gray. It is reasonable to expect that the effect of capital account liberalization on economic growth varies with the environment in which it occurs. The model in this paper confirms that there is a logical framework supporting this expectation since, in this model, the effect of capital account openness on growth varies with the degree of expropriation. This model suggests an empirical specification, one that can be implemented with data on capital account openness and institutional quality. The estimates from this model demonstrate that an open capital account can make an economically meaningful contribution to economic growth, and this effect is statistically significant. But, as predicted by the theory presented earlier in the paper, this estimated effect varies with institutional quality. In particular, the effect of capital account openness on growth is found to be statistically significant for only about 20 percent of the countries in the sample, and these countries tend to be ones with better (though not the best) institutions. There is a strong correlation between institutional quality and income per capita, and the countries that tend to significantly benefit from capital account liberalization are mostly upper-middle-income countries.
At a policy level, the results presented in this paper answer, to some extent, the critics of capital account liberalization who assert that its benefits have not been demonstrated. But the model and empirical results presented here do not offer an unqualified endorsement of capital account liberalization either. Instead, the main message of this paper is that the environment in which this policy takes place can have an important effect on its consequences. 
